Fallback and same day payment?

Reading the Bloomberg IBOR Fallback Rate Adjustments Rule Book just published.

I'm trying to understand the period for RFR composition. It looks that the period is based on the LIBOR tenor. It is not the "calculation period" that was used, but never defined, in the consultations.

Do I misunderstand something or there is something strange with the "two days shift" and the "two day shift" may actually be a 0 day shift with respect to the payment date? Do we end up having to pay same day in some cases?

My understanding of the dates and offsets leads to the following example, using the coming Monday as an example. I have a XXX-XIBOR-1M with effective date Friday 2020-03-27. The maturity date is Monday 2020-04-27. The "Accrual Start Date" for the composition has an offset of 2 business days and is Wednesday 2020-02-25, the "End Accrual Date" is 1 month later, i.e. Saturday 2020-04-25, adjusted to Monday 2020-04-27.

I'm not sure if it is possible to even have an end accrual date after the payment date. In USD, because the calendar for usual cash payments (USNY) and SOFR (USGS) are not the same, in theory we could arrive to that. It is enough to have a Monday that is USGS non-good business day and USNY good business day. I have not found one yet. Maybe another combination would do also, I will think more about it, but it is late now!

After all those shenanigans, do we actually end-up in the above example with a same-day payment? The introduction of the "Offset" or "Shift" was suppose to guarantee no same day payment. Is it a screw-up, an intentional feature or a financial fiction?

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