Not the end of the world!

If you read this, it means that the world has not ended!

Good to know the world can exist without LIBOR.

Actually some GBP-LIBOR fixing will still be published to the end of March 2024 and some USD-LIBOR will still be published to the end of September 2024 due to FCA use of “Article 23A benchmarks”. Maybe I penciled the wrong “end of the world date” in my calendar!

New “real” LIBOR (by opposition to the one invented by FCA) fixings are not published anymore, but old fixings still exists. We can see almost 10 trillions of it in the LCH data of Outstanding IRS.

In number for 30 June 2023 on USD 3-month tenor:

  • LIBOR fixing 5.54543
  • CME SOFR Term Rate: 5.26936
  • ISDA Spread: 0.26161
  • “Synthetic” LIBOR: 5.54543

There is a 1.546 bps gap somewhere! Where would that be? According to market rumours, both LIBOR and CME SOFR Term Rate are representative market rate as of 30 June 2023. We can only conclude that ISDA Spread is not a representative market rate. Why it will be used from Monday onward for many tens of trillions of LIBOR products for which it was not designed is beyond me.

I would have expected that the FCA, in charge of protecting consumers, would have forbidden the use of such a rate. But the fact that the same FCA has made the synthetic rate mandatory through Article 29A has maybe created a conflict of interest at the consumers’s expense.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Multi-curve framework book: new edition in progress

Image
Subject: Interest Rate Modelling in the Multi-curve Framework: Foundations, Evolution, and Implementation It has been more than 10 years since I wrote the first edition of the multi-curve framework book. What happened in those 10 years? Why did it take me so long to start a new version? It took me roughly 10 years to write the first edition. The reason it took so long at that time, was that I did not know that I was writing it! I thought I was writing a couple of pages on an obscured and theoretical idea that there was not a `` one curve to rule them all '' but multiple curves. It turned out that it became the actual practice for very clear and important reasons. That was the excuse for the first edition, what is the excuse for the second edition? Since the first edition, many things happen, in particular: March 2015: BCBS - IOSCO: margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives and mandatory variation margin July 2017: The future of LIBOR -- actually it
Read more

Rigged: part 1 - Will there be a part 2?

Image
I have been reading book “Rigged: The Incredible True Story of the Whistleblowers Jailed after Exposing the Rotten Heart of the Financial” (Andy Verity, Flint, June 2023) for some time. It was published several month ago, but I just finished it. To my defence, I have to say that I don’t feel comfortable reading fiction where the “bad guys” are systematically winning by cheating. The book is the story of the miscarriage of justice done in the LIBOR manipulation story. The book content did not surprise me. For anybody having worked on a (swap) trading desk, it is clear that what was described by the accusation was impossible. It is not possible for some middle level trader to create a multi-year, multi-desk, multi-bank international conspiracy over open lines, broker lines, on open offices etc. without all around them, including compliance and senior management to be fully aware of what is going on. Moreover the regulators cannot be ignorant of the situation, except pleading complete in
Read more

Pertes de la BNB: c’était prévu et nous payons!

La BNB: 3 milliards de pertes et encore 6 milliards à venir. Voir par example l’article de l’Echo: La perte de la BNB a dépassé 3 milliards d'euros en 2023 . 1) C’était le but! C’était prévu! 2) Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 3) Quatrième pouvoir? 1) C’était le but! Les achats d’obligations gouvernementales avaient pour but de diminuer le coût des emprunts pour les États concernés. Il y a bien sur la fiction que ce n’est pas du financement des états parce que les obligations sont achetées dans le marché secondaire aux banques commerciales. Une fiction car les banques commerciales; achètent ces obligations sur le marché primaire à un prix surévalué uniquement parce qu’elles savent qu’elles peuvent les revendre à un prix encore plus surévalué aux banques centrales. C’est d’une certaine façon un “pump and dump”. Si ce n’est que dans le “pump” le seul pompage est par les banque centrales et le reste sait que ce pump n’intervient que pour soutenir un actif de moindre qualité. Et
Read more