Le gouverneur de la BNB est-il imcompétent ou malhonnête?

Dans un récent article de l’Echo ont lit “S'exprimant dans l'émission "The Market" de la VRT, Pierre Wunsch, le gouverneur de la Banque nationale explique que les banques disposent encore d'une marge financière pour augmenter leurs taux d'épargne. Et d'ajouter: "Elles le feront, pas à grande vitesse. [...] "Emprunter de l'argent coûte aujourd'hui aux banques 4%. Nous ne cessons de répéter qu'elles ont des prêts hypothécaires dans leur bilan et qu'elles ne peuvent donc pas offrir un taux d'épargne de 3 ou 4 % à tout le monde."

Les paroles du gouverneur mènent à une conclusion: il est incompétent comme banquier ou il est incompétent comme régulateur (ou logique, non-exclusif). Il reste aussi la possibilité qu’il soit malhonnête intellectuellement et qu’il mente, mais je ne peux personnellement envisager une telle hypothèse.

Il est possible qu’il soit incompétent comme banquier et il ne comprends pas la gestion ALM d’une banque où les risques de taux des crédits hypoithécaires ont du être couverts d’une façon ou d’une autre, pas des swap de taux par example; il est possible qu’il soit incompétent comme régulateur et qu’il n’ai pas vérifié les bilans des banques pour s’assuré que les risques de taux sont effectivement couverts de manière effective.

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